Narodna Odbrana Zapadne Bosne

Why the NOZB Was Formed

Western Bosnia did not set out to “break away.” The local leadership argued autonomy as a survival and governance fix inside an encircled region where supply, wages, and public order were collapsing and where Sarajevo’s party structures tried to run a parallel command. Through 1992–93, Agrokomerc shouldered humanitarian logistics (including for the 5th Corps), negotiating corridors so food, medicine, and fuel could reach civilians. After violence and repression against citizens who supported autonomy—along with flashpoints like Skokovi/Johovica—local support to the 5th Corps ended, and NOZB formed to defend communities, keep production and services alive, and prevent Western Bosnia from being politically crushed. In this telling, autonomy was limited and political (less than a canton), and the NOZB was its defensive arm—born from necessity, not ideology.

Fighting & Territory
Struggles for influence among soldiers began early, and many members of the ARBiH 5th Corps joined the ranks of NOZB. The autonomists also sought to establish control in Cazin; on September 20, a column with about 500 5th Corps soldiers entered the city and held it briefly. Most defectors to NOZB came from the 521st and 527th Brigades (Velika Kladuša)—later the backbone of APZB’s 1st and 2nd NOZB Brigades—followed by fighters from the 504th and part of the 503rd (Cazin) and the 517th (Pjanići), growing into four full NOZB brigades. The 5th Corps tried to carve small enclaves inside APZB to split its territory, but with thin reserves and fear of VRS striking from the rear, those moves failed.

On October 15, 1993, VRS launched several attacks on 5th Corps positions, creating a window for NOZB to approach Cazin “without firing a shot” while the main ARBiH force was engaged. The push—led by Nevzad Đerić “Keđo,” commander of NOZB’s 4th Brigade—halted the next day; NOZB withdrew to initial lines without major engagement. In response, on October 18, 1993, the 5th Corps shelled Velika Kladuša, but the autonomists held.

A key political moment followed on October 22, 1993, when Fikret Abdić, Radovan Karadžić (RS), and Slobodan Milošević (FRY) met and agreed on practical cooperation—signaling intent to normalize relations and reduce fighting between Abdić’s Muslim side and Serb forces.

In early November 1993, about 1,500 autonomists crossed through the Republic of Serbian Krajina and struck the 5th Corps from the west, advancing several kilometers along the Cazinska/RSK border, recapturing Skokovi and pushing south of Velika Kladuša. During these battles, Serb forces supported the autonomists with artillery, ammunition, manpower, and tanks.

By December 1993, NOZB controlled roughly one-third of Cazinska Krajina with about 10,000 men. Lacking heavy weapons limited large offensives, but NOZB still reduced ARBiH-held areas; the 5th Corps failed to defeat the autonomists, and the front stabilized by month’s end.

In early 1994, APZB held about 60 km² in the north of the “Bihać pocket” and now had several tanks and key artillery pieces. By mid-January 1994, the 5th Corps went on the offensive in the central sector, advancing up to 2 km and occupying Skokovi. On February 16, 1994, NOZB—with Serbian artillery support—launched an offensive on Cazin, which was repulsed. Spring 1994 saw no major actions. In June 1994, a truce was concluded between the 5th Corps and VRS; Atif Dudaković then ordered “all forces against the autonomists,” aided by the fact that Abdić did not sign the truce.

Operation Tiger–Freedom ’94 (June 2 – August 21, 1994)

A “convert” from the 5th Corps 502nd Brigade, Hamdija Abdić “Tigar,” secretly approached Abdić as a dissatisfied commander offering his services—for a price. Cautious but hoping to reduce inter-Muslim fighting, Abdić provided funds and promised support if conflict escalated.

Tigar then informed Dudaković; aid workers and soldiers of the 5th Corps staged large tire fires and fired into the air to simulate combat/damage—deceiving NOZB. While NOZB shifted men and resources in response, the 5th Corps seized badly needed weapons, forcing NOZB to reroute.

June 2, 1994 – 5th Corps probes the Liskovac–Pećigrad line; NOZB counterattacks toward Skokovi and repels it.

June 13, 1994 – 5th Corps attacks Pećigrad, Todorovo, Golubovići, reaching Pećigrad (key on the road to Velika Kladuša) and taking ~20 km².

June 15–16, 1994 – NOZB halts the advance and recaptures Liskovac.

June 20, 1994 – 506th and 505th Brigades assault Golubovići and Pećigrad. The fiercest fighting centers on Pećigrad (defended by NOZB 4th Brigade), surrounded on three sides. Multiple 506th attacks are repulsed; 5th Corps progress slows due to stiff resistance.

Early July 1994 – Hakija Abdić appears in the 5th NOZB Brigade area (Cmdr. Muharem Ćerimović), is reported and vetted. Claiming ~100 men would follow him and that he wouldn’t shoot at “brothers” in APZB, Hakija asks to meet Zahid Abdić (TO Velika Kladuša). A series of peace contacts follows (Rasim Bašić, Irfan Saračević, Arif Vuković, Ibrahim Behrić), exploring a stop to inter-Muslim combat—later undercut by operational deception.

July 7, 1994 – Bosnian and Western media report the French UNPROFOR battalion in Bihać blocks base access over alleged “rebel” attacks in 5th Corps ranks—part of a planned ruse to justify concurrent actions.

July 9, 1994 – Fighting continues on the Krivaja–Čajići line; RSK artillery supports the autonomists.

July 11, 1994 – 5th Corps elements cross into Serbian Krajina to suppress an SVK artillery battery aiding NOZB; within three days they are repulsed with heavy losses.

Deception about a “mutiny” in Bihać—500–2,000 fighters supposedly joining NOZB—leads Abdić to anticipate mass defections. The French battalion’s posture and reports (e.g., alleged incidents at Izačić) help mask the ruse.

Structure of the People’s Defense of Western Bosnia (1993–1994)
1st Brigade NOZB — Cmdr. Zumret Brkić “Kobra”
2nd Brigade NOZB — Cmdr. Nijaz Nuhanović
3rd Brigade NOZB — Cmdr. Osman Čaušević
4th Brigade NOZB — Cmdr. Nevzad Đerić “Keđo”
5th Brigade NOZB — Cmdr. Muharem Ćerimović “Hare”
6th Brigade NOZB — Cmdr. Sead Talakić “Ceco”

Structure of the People’s Defense of Western Bosnia (1994–1995)
1st Brigade — Cmdr. Izet Latić “Izo”
2nd Brigade — Cmdr. Zumret Brkić “Kobra”
3rd Brigade — Cmdr. Asim Bašagić “Zenga”

Special-Purpose Units (recon, direct action, urban clearing)
Šejla — Cmdr. Ismet Gračanin “Ćićmo”
Ajkini — Cmdr. Hasan Galijašević “Ajkin”
Metalni — Cmdr. Ramiz Rizvić “Metalni”
Golubovi — Cmdr. Zlatko Hušidić
Jastrebovi
Zenge — Cmdr. Besim Muhamedagić “Zenga”
Husko
Orlovi Pravde — Cmdr. Jasminko Dizdarević “Jakić”

IZĐ “Jakić” (Recon–Diversion Company) — Cmdr. J. Dizdarević “Jakić”
Otpisani (Special Operations Platoon)
Crne Pume (Recon–Diversion Company) — Cmdr. Mirsad Mešić
Keka (Intervention Platoon) — Cmdr. Edin Kekić “Keka”
Kerovi (Special Police)
Zmajevi — Cmdr. Hašim Latić “Zmaj”
OBL (Obezbjeđenje objekata i lica, protection of facilities & persons)
“Surovi” (Training & Recruitment Center)

Command
Commander-in-Chief: Asim Delić (former JNA reserve officer)
Deputy: Hamdija Mašić
Chief of Staff: Hasib Hodžić
Chief of Security: Rasim Bašić

Three tactical groups operated under a joint command headquartered at Petrova Gora (established November 6, 1994):

Fikret Abdić (Western Bosnia)

Milorad Ulemek “Legija”

Radojica Božović “Kobac”

By late 1994, Serbian and Abdić forces retook Velika Kladuša. Units of the 5th Corps—led by the 505th Bužim Brigade—withdrew from the town center in December due to unfavorable conditions, shifting to mountain fighting south of the town, where Serbian artillery could be used more intensively than in urban combat. During fighting on Prokres Hill, 5th Corps IDČ commander Jasmin Kulenović “Havarija” was killed.

The advance was eventually stopped on the Johovica–Donja Lučka–Podzvizd line, and the main focus moved toward the 505th Bužim Brigade front. Until March 1995, battles raged for Podzvizd and Kumarica toward Bužim.

In March 1995, the 505th Brigade punched toward Velika Kladuša, driving deep into Polje with help from 502nd Brigade and the 1st Bosnian Liberation Brigade. NOZB, backed by Serbian artillery, countered hard—taking Kumarica and encircling ARBiH elements. The 5th Corps were forced to retreat, falling back toward Vrnograč.

By late spring, Abdić’s forces held Vrnograč and pressed on Bužim. The Johovica–Gornja Vidovska–Donja Lučka sector stayed mostly static while the fight shifted to the Bosanska Bojna–Zborište–Crvarevac–Šestanovac axis; the heaviest clashes slammed into Žuta Zemlja.

From there, NOZB and Serbian units broke through again, forcing the 505th back to the Pehovo fallback line—the ridge system that set up the decisive fights for Bužim. In late July 1995, Abdić’s formations ripped a gap near Johovica and surged toward Cazin. By 4 August 1995, they stood on the Tržac–Krivaja–Čajići–Skokovi line—within sight of Cazin. Overnight 4–5 August, Franko Simatović’s paramilitaries pulled out, and NOZB was suddenly alone against the ARBiH 5th Corps.

What followed wasn’t just military. In the narrative that took hold after the war, APZB fighters and their families were branded “traitors,” many treated as second-class citizens, while civilian killings and abuses tied to 5th Corps were minimized or buried. For Western Bosnia, the campaign’s final chapter was a social and political punishment laid on an entire community—not just soldiers.

With Operation Storm and the collapse of RSK, major operations in Western Bosnia ceased. APZB structures dissolved, large numbers of civilians were displaced, and the region entered post-war reintegration—leaving contested narratives, unresolved trauma, and a long struggle to document what actually happened.  To this day the region's recovery is being disrupted by the federal government. 

It must be remembered with great grace who the NOZB fighters were. With limited heavy weapons, they leaned on small-unit tactics, night movements, and counter-ambush drills—turning terrain knowledge into an equalizer. Platoon and company leaders held lines under artillery and armor pressure, regrouping and counterpunching when larger formations would’ve folded. Fighters rotated from the front to help keep food, fuel, and medical supplies moving; local industry and farms were plugged directly into the war effort.

Even opponents from Croatia, Serbia, and ARBiH units often acknowledged their tenacity and fieldcraft—a reputation earned in places like Pećigrad, Skokovi, Žuta Zemlja, and Pehovo.

NOZB fighters weren’t “militias of convenience.” They were disciplined, locally rooted troops who held ground against larger forces under siege economics, keeping their families fed and their towns alive. They organized out of necessity, not ambition—not to seize power or “win” a war, but to keep Western Bosnia standing long enough for civilians to survive. When RSK withdrew and Croatia massed behind our rear, the strategic map flipped; any force in Western Bosnia would have been cut off. We acknowledge that reality plainly. But we also reject the narrative that we were “crushed.”  What ended was geopolitics, not a broken line. Units that had held for years against better-equipped opponents were suddenly isolated. Many chose to stand down rather than feed civilians into a meat-grinder, preserving lives, extracting families where possible, and refusing to dissolve into chaos. They fought to buy time, to limit reprisals, and when the price of continuing was annihilation, they chose survival with dignity over pointless sacrifice. They are also honored for the stand they took—standing up to Alija Izetbegović—derided by many as “crazy Alija”—and to the central policy they believed would erase them. To many who watched from the outside, Western Bosnia’s fighters and families embodied a pragmatic, “civilized” European Muslim identity—work, order, and law under fire. 

Their skill and sacrifice deserve to be recorded without euphemism—and without erasure.